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Abstract—Physical-layer group secret-key (GSK) generation is
an effective way of generating secret keys in wireless networks,
wherein the nodes exploit inherent randomness in the wireless
channels to generate group keys, which are subsequently applied
to secure messages while broadcasting, relaying, and other
network-level communications. While existing GSK protocols
focus on securing the common source of randomness from
external eavesdroppers, they assume that the legitimate nodes of
the group are trusted. In this paper, we address insider attacks
from the legitimate participants of the wireless network during
the key generation process. Instead of addressing conspicuous
attacks such as switching-off communication, injecting noise, or
denying consensus on group keys, we introduce stealth attacks
that can go undetected against state-of-the-art GSK schemes. We
propose two forms of attacks, namely: (i) different-key attacks,
wherein an insider attempts to generate different keys at different
nodes, especially across nodes that are out of range so that
they fail to recover group messages despite possessing the group
key, and (ii) low-rate key attacks, wherein an insider alters
the common source of randomness so as to reduce the key-
rate. We also discuss various detection techniques, which are
based on detecting anomalies and inconsistencies on the channel
measurements at the legitimate nodes. Through simulations we
show that GSK generation schemes are vulnerable to insider-
threats, especially on topologies that cannot support additional
secure links between neighbouring nodes to verify the attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
In wireless ad hoc networks the participating nodes typi-
cally engage in group communication such as broadcasting,
multiple-access, or relaying operations, where more than two
nodes may be simultaneously involved. These sophisticated
protocols are motivated by mission-critical goals such as
achieving high-throughput, or supporting resource-constrained
nodes (such as bandwidth and power) in the network. In
order to secure group communication from external eavesdrop-
pers, the nodes use group secret keys (GSKs) to exchange
confidential data, and are also involved in key management
tasks such as key generation, distribution and maintenance
[1]. While strengthening the security of key management
is an evolving research field, researchers are concurrently
focussing on methods to dynamically generate secret keys
by exploiting randomness available in the environment. The
purpose of dynamic key generation is either to use it as an
independent recipe of generating keys, or to use it to update
the existing keys. Dynamic key generation techniques are well
known, and have been particularly well studied in the context
of wireless two-user physical-layer key generation (PKG)
[2]. In PKG, the two participants observe a common source
of randomness to generate a common key without leaking
information to an external passive eavesdropper. Although, the
sources of randomness are innumerable, easily accessible ones
are the variations in the wireless channel strengths, such as
the received signal strength indicator (RSSI) values, complex
baseband signal samples, and the channel estimates. Other than
the concept of generating secret-keys for two nodes that are
within radio frequency (RF) range, some works [3]-[5] have
also addressed using third-party relay(s) to assist the secret-
key generation between nodes that are out of range.
A generalization of relay-assisted secret-key sharing is the
concept of wireless physical-layer group secret key (GSK)
generation, wherein a group of nodes in the network generate
a secret key by observing a common source of randomness [6],
[7], [9]. Unlike two-user wireless PKG, in GSK generation,
nodes in the group exchange additional messages apart from
the pilots so that all the nodes witness the common source of
randomness. GSK generation is applicable in ad hoc wireless
networks that operate in mobile environments, e.g., MANETs
and VANETs [14]. Existing works on GSK have focused on
developing protocols for exchanging messages so as to (i)
reduce the latency, and (ii) to secure the generated keys from
an external eavesdropper [6], [7], [9]. Also, the models assume
trusted group members and secure the communication against
passive eavesdroppers and active attacks from external nodes.
In this work, we deviate at this point, to not to discard the
possibility of the presence of insiders that involve in active
attacks, that disturb the key generation process. In particular,
we incorporate the possibility that some legitimate nodes
might be compromised (for e.g., as in [10]), and the attackers
might enter the system as insiders before the commencement
of key generation.
Our specific contributions are:
• We introduce a novel threat model with insider-
compromise, that prior works have not considered. Some
crude attacks in our model are to stop relaying signals
in the key-generation process, or to inject noise into the
system, or to prevent the neighbouring nodes in achieving
consensus on the group secret key. We, however, consider
more sophisticated attacks that enable the attacker to
manipulate the key generation process and yet go unde-
tected. More specifically, we have proposed the following
two types of attacks: (i) different-key attacks, wherein
an insider attempts to force different realizations of key
at different nodes, especially in a network when the
legitimate nodes do not have private channels to verify
the attack (for e.g., in chain-topology based networks [8]),
and (ii) low-rate key attacks, wherein an insider attempts
to slow down the channel variations over time, in order
to reduce the secret-key rate, which is a measure of how
fast the generated keys can be updated (Section III).
• To detect the above attacks, one can envision a scheme
that uses a separate communication channel built on
neighbour discovery and explicit pair-wise communica-
tion with the legitimate neighbours; however, such a
straightforward scheme introduces new sets of vulnerabil-
ities and can be expensieve in terms of communication-
overhead. Therefore, we apply detection schemes that are
based on standard phy-layer techniques such as measur-
ing average power levels and Doppler spread (variations
of channel over time) [11] to identify anomalies and in-
consistencies. We show that the proposed insider-attacks
can go undetected on the state-of-the-art GSK generation
schemes with a non-negligible rate despite using off-the-
shelf channel measurement techniques. This implies that
GSK generation schemes are vulnerable to insider-threats,
especially on topologies that cannot support additional
secure links between neighbouring nodes to verify the
attacks. (Section IV)
II. SYSTEM MODEL FOR GSK GENERATION
Consider a chain-topology based wireless network of N
nodes, denoted by the set S = {1, 2, . . . , N−1, N}, where the
nodes want to securely communicate among each other using
a GSK. We assume that a GSK is dynamically generated at
the nodes by exploiting common randomness in the wireless
channels. The wireless channel between Node i ∈ S and Node
j = i + 1 ∈ S is denoted by a discrete random process
{hij(l) ∈ C | l = 1, 2, 3, . . .}, where the index l captures
the realization of the channels at different time instants. All
the channels are assumed quasi-static with identical coherence
interval of Tc seconds, and thus {hij(l)} can be viewed as
the output of sampling a continuous random process {hij(t)}
at t = lTc for l = 1, 2, . . .. Here, {hij(l)} denotes the set of
channel estimates derived from the complex baseband samples
at the receivers. We assume that nodes communicate on a
single frequency but in time division duplex (TDD) fashion,
i.e., no two nodes transmit at the same time. Also, by the
virtue of channel reciprocity, we assume that nodes i and
j observe the same channel environment between them, i.e.,
hij(l) = hji(l). Further, the network topology is assumed to
be fixed over several blocks of coherence intervals.
In the above network model, the nodes intend to generate a
GSK by observing an accessible and secure source of common
randomness. Unlike two-node physical-layer key generation,
which requires a minimum of two rounds of pilot exchanges,
the multi-node generalization requires more exchanges; the
number of times a node transmits depends on the underlying
protocol, and also the chosen source of common randomness.
For the chain-topology, the set of all channels for a given l is
H(l) = {hij(l) | ∀j = i+1}. For this case, the common source
of randomness is some function f(H′(l)) ∈ C for H′(l) ⊂
H(l). Since each node can broadcast its pilot to a maximum
of two nodes, some nodes need to forward their observations
so that all the nodes witness H′(l).
We assume that the coherence time Tc is longer than one
round of the GSK generation protocol. A generic protocol for
exchanging the observations is given below:
• For l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L}
– For i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}
∗ Node i broadcasts pilot symbol(s), which are used
by the rest of the nodes in its RF range to learn
the corresponding channel estimates.
End
– Depending on the target H′, the nodes exchange their
acquired set of channel estimates, one after the other
until each node learns f(H′(l)).
End
In practice, GSK generation protocols have to be repeated
L times to accumulate the required number of bits for the
digital key (say K bits). Therefore, the number L depends on
number of bits generated in every round (say k bits). Also, the
nodes go through additional rounds of communication over a
public channel to arrive at consensus on the generated digital
secret. In this work, we only focus on the protocol for sharing
observations, as it is fundamental to establishing the common
source of randomness. For some examples of physical-layer
GSK generation, we refer the readers to [8], [9].
A. Illustrative Example
Consider a small network of three nodes S = {1, 2, 3}
as shown in Fig. 1, where the nodes 1 and 3 are out of
each other’s RF range. This implies that nodes 1 and 3
can communicate only through Node 2. We assume that the
topology remains fixed for L rounds of the protocol. For
a given l, the set of underlying channels of the network
is H(l) = {h12(l), h23(l)}, which is the set of complex
channel estimates. For this network, let the common source
of randomness be h12(l)h23(l), which implies H′(l) = H(l)
and f is a product function. To gain insights, we assume that
the nodes in the network do not experience additive noise
(the noisy case is treated in Section IV). To achieve the
target h12(l)h23(l) at all the nodes, the following protocol
is followed during the l-th round [4].1
• Phase 1: Node 1 transmits a pilot symbol p = 1, which
is used by Node 2 to learn h12(l), i.e,
Θ1,2(l) = h12(l). (1)
Here Θi,j(l) denotes the observation seen by Node j at
the end of Phase i.
1Although the protocol in [4] was primarily proposed to facilitate two-
node secret generation via a relay, the same technique has been generalized
to generate a GSK in mesh networks by [9]. In this work, we apply the
protocol of [4] for GSK generation in chain topology.
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Fig. 1. A GSK generation protocol between nodes 1, 2 and 3, where h12
denotes the channel between nodes 1 and 2, and h23 denotes the channel
between nodes 2 and 3. The protocol includes 4 phases (read clock-wise
from top left), at the end of which all the 3 nodes learn the common source
of randomness h12h23.
• Phase 2: Node 3 transmits a pilot symbol p = 1, which
is used by Node 2 to learn h23(l), i.e,
Θ2,2(l) = h23(l). (2)
• Phase 3: Node 2 transmits a pilot symbol p = 1, which
is used by Node 1 to learn h12(l), and Node 3 to learn
h23(l), i.e.,
Θ3,1(l) = h12(l),Θ3,3(l) = h23(l). (3)
• Phase 4: Finally, Node 2 broadcasts the sum h12(l) +
h23(l) to the other nodes. Node 1 and Node 3 receive
h12(l)(h12(l) + h23(l)) and h23(l)(h12(l) + h23(l)), re-
spectively, i.e,
Θ4,1(l) = h12(l)(h12(l) + h23(l)), (4)
Θ4,3(l) = h23(l)(h12(l) + h23(l)). (5)
Since nodes 1 and 3 already know one of the components
in the linear combination, they cancel the self-interference
to retrieve h12(l)h23(l), i.e.,
Θsc4,1(l) = h12(l)h23(l),Θ
sc
4,3(l) = h12(l)h23(l). (6)
Meanwhile, since Node 2 has the realizations of two
channels, it computes the product to acquire the common
randomness.
The above protocol is depicted in Fig. 1 by dropping the index
l. In this illustrative example, the order of the first three phases
Phase 1, Phase 2 and Phase 3 can be permuted in any of 6
possible ways.
III. THREAT MODEL
We study insider-attacks from one of the nodes in the
network (specifically the middle node), and leave open the
general problem of multiple-insiders or collaborative insider-
attacks for future research. We assume that the attacker in
the network has the following capabilities: Assumption 1: The
insider can transmit signals with higher power than the rest of
the nodes. Assumption 2: The insider has large storage size to
store the past channel realizations of the network. Assumption
3: The insider can learn the topology of the network.
We envisage the following two types of attacks from an
insider during the key generation process.
A. Different-Key Attack
In GSK generation, the nodes have to securely exchange
their observations so that they view correlated source of
randomness. A potential threat is the different-key attack,
wherein an insider forwards messages to partition the network
into two or more subgroups such that nodes across subgroups
observe uncorrelated source of randomness. As a result, the
nodes across subgroups are forced to generate a different
digital-key than the rest of the nodes in other subgroups. If
the insider achieves such an attack, then the nodes believe
that they have the correct group key. However, during the data
communication phase, they will fail to accurately recover the
group messages due to mismatched keys. Assumption 2 and
Assumption 3 may have to be invoked to realize this attack.
We exemplify a different-key attack on the protocol of Section
II-A, by introducing the attack parameters {ρ, ρ1, ρ2} such that
the special case of {ρ = 1, ρ1 = h12, ρ2 = h23} represents
the no-attack case.
1) Different-key attack on the chain-topology by Node 2:
For the protocol discussed in Section II-A, Node 2 gets two
chances to sabotage the key-generation process in every round;
first time when it transmits the pilot p = 1, and the next time
when it transmits the sum of two channels h12(l)+h23(l). The
most general attack scenario from Node 2 is the following:
• In Phase 3, Node 2 transmits p = ρ(l) ∈ C other than
p = 1.
• In Phase 4, Node 2 transmits ρ1(l) + ρ2(l) instead of
h12(l) + h23(l), where ρ1(l) and ρ2(l) are chosen based
on the attack-objective.
Since p = ρ(l) in Phase 3, the nodes 1 and 3 believe that
their channels to Node 2 are ρh12(l) and ρh23(l), respectively.
Upon completion of Phase 4, the observations at Node 1 and
Node 3 after cancelling self-interference are respectively given
by,
Θsc4,1(l) = h12(l) (ρ1(l) + ρ2(l))− ρ
2(l)h12(l),
Θsc4,3(l) = h23(l)(ρ1(l) + ρ2(l))− ρ
2(l)h23(l).
The objective of the different-key attack is to make sure
that Θsc4,1(l) and Θsc4,3(l) are uncorrelated, which can be
achieved by choosing ρ1(l), ρ2(l) statistically independent of
h12(l), h23(l). In this example, Assumption 2 has to be invoked
in order to store the channels {ρ1(l), ρ2(l)}, and Assumption
3 has to be invoked for Node 2 to learn the chain-topology.
In (7) - (9), we illustrate the effect of the different-key attack
on the digital keys, by quantizing the values of |Θsc4,3| and
|Θsc4,1| into two levels. Although more sophisticated algorithms
exist in literature to generate digital keys [2], we have used
a primitive method to showcase the effect of the proposed
attacks on the digital keys.
Kno attack = [0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1] , (7)
K1attack = [0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1] , (8)
K3attack = [0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1] . (9)
In the above example, 8-bit digital group keys are generated
with (denoted by K1attack and K3attack for Node 1 and 3, re-
spectively) and without (denoted by Kno attack) the different-
key attack by Node 2. With the different-key attack, the keys
generated at Node 1 and Node 3 are different.
B. Low-Rate Key Attack
In physical-layer GSK generation, the number of bits gen-
erated from every round of the protocol determines the key-
rate. To illustrate further, if k bits of GSK are generated
from each round, and the absolute time difference between
successive rounds is τ seconds, then the key-rate is k
τ
bits/sec.
This implies that to generate a random bit sequence of length
K , say K = 128 for application under advanced encryption
standard, the key generation method requires Kτ
k
seconds.
Thus, if we wish to update the K-bit key frequently, then we
should use wireless channels that support high entropy, and/or
use protocols that have low-latency.
With the above discussion on key-rate, a possible insider-
attack is to lower the key-rate. This can be accomplished
either by reducing the entropy of the channel, i.e., by reducing
the number k, or by enforcing a slow-varying channel so
that the accumulated bits look structured rather than random.
Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 may have to be invoked to
realize this attack. We illustrate a low-rate key attack on the
protocol of Section II-A. In the next subsection, we introduce
the attack parameters {ρ, ρ1, ρ2} for the low-rate attack such
that the special case of ρ = ρ1 = ρ2 = 1 represents no-attack.
1) Low-rate key attack on the chain-topology by Node 2:
To execute a low-rate key attack, the fundamental criterion is
to enforce Θsc4,1(l) and Θsc4,3(l) are identical and vary slowly
over time. An attack strategy from Node 2 is given below:
• In Phase 3, instead of p = 1, Node 2 transmits p =
ρ(l) ∈ C.
• In Phase 4, Node 2 transmits ρ1(l)h12(l) + ρ2(l)h23(l)
instead of h12(l)+h23(l), where ρ1(l) and ρ2(l) suitably
chosen.
Under the above threat model, choosing ρ1(l) = ρ2(l) = ρ2(l)
forces
Θsc4,1(l) = ρ
2(l)h12(l)h23(l) and Θsc4,3(l) = ρ2(l)h12(l)h23(l).
Although nodes 1 and 3 observe identical source of random-
ness, their realization has been changed by ρ2(l). With this
attack, the nodes are forced to believe that the individual
channels are ρ(l)h12(l) and ρ(l)h23(l), instead of h12(l) and
h23(l), respectively. For the above model, the attacker can
replace Θsc4,1(l) and Θsc4,3(l) by a slow-varying channel h′(l)
by choosing ρ(l) as ρ(l) =
√
h′(l)
h12(l)h23(l)
. Thus, this attack
forces the nodes to generate a structured digital key rather
than a random one.
In (10) - (11), we illustrate the effect of low-rate key attack
on the digital keys, by quantizing the values of |Θsc4,3| and
|Θsc4,1| into two levels.
Kno attack = [1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1] , (10)
Kattack = [1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1] . (11)
In the above example, 8-bit digital group key is generated with
(denoted by Kattack) and without (denoted by Kno attack)
the low-rate key attack by Node 2. With the low-rate key
attack, the channel realizations are forced to vary slowly over
time, thereby ensuring the quantized values to lie in one of
the regions.
IV. DETECTION TECHNIQUES AND SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we discuss possible techniques to detect
insider-attacks during the key generation protocol. Detection
methods can be broadly classified into two types: (i) direct
detection and (ii) indirect detection. In the former class, the
nodes communicate among each other to verify the correctness
of the generated key by exchanging either the common source
of randomness or the generated key (preferably over a private
channel to shield leakage from an eavesdropper). In the latter
class of methods, the nodes do not explicitly exchange keys
or common source of randomness, instead they measure some
physical characteristics of their channels to identify anomalies
or inconsistencies. For the chain-topology based networks,
former class of methods suffer from higher communication-
overhead (e.g., nodes need high transmit power to reach the
farther nodes), and hence, we focus on the following standard
methods in the latter class: (i) Measurement of Doppler spread
[11] (ii) Measurement of average power levels on the channel
estimates.
In the rest of the section, we present a comprehensive
analysis on the possibility of detecting an insider-attack by
measuring some physical characteristics of wireless channels.
In our simulations, we incorporate the existence of additive
noise at all the receivers. As a result, the observations made
at the nodes are erroneous channel estimates (not ideal as
in Section II-A). To demonstrate the impact of the detection
schemes, we realize the attacks of Section III on the protocol
discussed in Section II-A.
A. Simulation Setup
For simulations, all the channels in the network
{h12(l), h23(l)} are generated using the 1-st order AR model
[12] as,
h12(l + 1) = Fh12(l) + n12(l),
h23(l + 1) = Fh23(l) + n23(l),
for l > 1, where F is the Doppler spread of the channel,
formally defined as
F = E{hij(l)hij(l + 1)} = J0(2pifdτ), (12)
with J0(·) denoting the zero-th order Bessel function of first
kind, τ is the absolute time difference (in seconds) between the
l-th and (l + 1)-th samples, and fd is the Doppler frequency.
The Doppler frequency is given by fd = fc vc , where v is
the node velocity, c is the speed of light and fc is the carrier
frequency of signal transmission. For the simulations, we use
F = 0.98. The noise components n12, n23 are such that
h12(l), h23(l) are independent and distributed as circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian noise with zero mean and unit
variance, denoted by CN (0, 1). We assume that the nodes
employ the state-of-the-art channel estimation algorithms [13]
to estimate the channel gains.
At the end of Phase 3, the noisy estimates at nodes 1 and
3 are given by,
Θ3,1(l) = h12(l) + z3,1(l),Θ3,3(l) = h23(l) + z3,3(l). (13)
Similarly, at the end of Phase 4, the estimates before self-
interference cancellation are
Θ4,1(l) = h12(l)(h23(l) + h12(l)) + z4,1(l) and
Θ4,3(l) = h23(l)(h12(l) + h23(l)) + z4,3(l), (14)
and after self-interference cancellation are
Θsc4,1(l) = Θ4,1(l)− (Θ3,1(l))
2 and
Θsc4,3(l) = Θ4,3(l)− (Θ3,3(l))
2.
In (13) and (14), the noise components z3,j(l) and z4,j(l),
for j ∈ {1, 3} capture the errors in channel estimates, and
they are assumed to be distributed as CN (0, αi,j), where αi,j
denotes their variance values. In practice, αi,j depends on
the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the wireless channel, the
number of pilots used to estimate the channel, and also the
underlying channel estimation method. For our experiments,
we use {αi,j} such that the normalized mean square error
(NMSE) values during Phase 3 and Phase 4 are held fixed at
some η, i.e., for j ∈ {1, 3},
E{|Θ3,j(l)− hj(l)|
2}
E{|hj(l)|2}
=
α3,j
E{|hj(l)|2}
= η,
where h1(l) = h12(l) and h3(l) = h23(l). Similarly,
E{|Θ4,j(l)− hj(l)(h1(l) + h3(l))|2}
E{|hj(l)(h1(l) + h3(l))|2}
= η.
Other than considering noisy estimates, we also study the
impact of the attacks against the number of observations,
which here refers to the number of rounds of the protocol
(denoted by L). In the following subsections, we share simu-
lation results obtained while detecting the different-key attack
and the low-rate key attacks.
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Fig. 2. Different-key attack with static values of ρ1, ρ2: Probability of
detection (PD) and Probability of false alarm (PFA) values as a function
of channel estimate quality measured by the normalized mean square error
(NMSE) values in dB, and the number of rounds of the protocol. This attack
can go undetected even at moderately large values of L.
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Fig. 3. Low-rate key attack from Node 2: PD and PFA values as a function
of NMSE values and the number of rounds of the protocol. This detection
technique requires accurate channel estimates (with lower NMSE) and more
number of protocol rounds.
B. Different-Key Attacks by Node 2
We have simulated a different-key attack of Section III-A1
on the protocol in Section II-A. We refer to this attack
as the static different-key attack, wherein ρ = 1 ∀l, and
ρ1(l) = h12(1), ρ2(l) = h23(1) ∀l, i.e., ρ1(l), ρ2(l) are fixed
throughout several rounds of the protocol. In our experiments,
we measure the average power levels on the signals received
during Phase 3 and Phase 4 to calculate the probability
of detection (PD) and probability of false alarm (PFA). In
particular, the following decision rule was used to detect an
attack:
DETECT =
{
1, if E{|Θ4,j(l)|
2}
E{|Θsc
4,j
(l)|2} < 1, for j ∈ {1, 3}.
0, otherwise.
(15)
where the expectation is empirically computed over L rounds
of the protocol. The above decision rule follows due to self-
interference cancellation at nodes 1 and 3. The different-
key attack would result in significant difference in the power
levels before and after interference cancellation due to non-
zero residual terms ρ1h12 − (ρh12)2 and ρ2h23 − (ρh23)2.
However, the residual terms get fully cancelled in the no
attack case. Based on the above rule, the attack is detected
if atleast one of the nodes output the flag DETECT = 1. The
results on PD and PFA were obtained by repeatedly running
the protocol for L = {50, 100, 150, 200} against NMSE values
of η = {−20,−30,−40} in dB. The results are plotted in Fig.
2, which show that the static attack gets undetected significant
number of times. The plots also show that the probability of
false alarm is higher for lower number of observations. This
trade-off between PD and PFA can be further optimized by
treating the above detection problem as a binary hypothesis
problem.
C. Low-Rate Key Attack by Node 2
We have simulated a low-rate key attack of Section III-B1 in
order to force a Doppler spread of F = 0.99 on the common
source of randomness {Θsc4,1(l)} and {Θsc4,3(l)}, by replacing
h12(l)h23(l) by ρ2(l)h12(l)h23(l), which otherwise takes the
value of F = 0.96 (since {h12(l)} and {h23(l)} have Doppler
spread of F = 0.98, the product {h12(l)h23(l)} should
have Doppler spread of 0.96). In our experiments, we have
gathered Doppler measurements to compute the probability
of detection (PD) and probability of false alarm (PFA). The
Doppler computations were obtained as
F3,j = E
{
Θ3,j(l + 1)Θ
∗
3,j(l)
|Θ3,j(l)|2
}
, F4,j = E
{
Θ4,j(l + 1)Θ
∗
4,j(l)
|Θ4,j(l)|2
}
where F3,j and F4,j denote the measured Doppler values on
{Θ3,j} and {Θsc4,j}, respectively at Node j for j ∈ {1, 3}.
These values are empirically computed over L rounds of
the protocol. The following decision rule was used on the
measured Doppler values:
DETECT =
{
1, if (F3,j < 0.94) & (F4,j > 0.96)
0, Otherwise.
(16)
The above decision rule is coined based on the rationale that
the Doppler measurements on {Θsc4,1(l)} and {Θsc4,3(l)} should
be less than (or equal to) that of {Θ3,1(l)} and {Θ3,3(l)},
respectively, in the no attack case. This is because the Doppler
spread of the product of two independent channels is lower
than or equal to that of each channel in the first-order AR
model. We noticed that the criterion on average power levels
cannot be used to detect this attack since the attack parameters
make sure that the self-interference is successfully cancelled
at both nodes 1 and 3. The PD and PFA results were obtained
for the number of protocol rounds L = {100, 250, 500}
with NMSE values of η = {−20,−30,−40} in dB. The
corresponding values of PD and PFA are plotted in Fig. 3,
which shows that the low-rate attack can go undetected unless
measured over large values of L, along with accurate channel
estimate values. The threshold values on the Doppler spread
can be subject to optimization to further improve the trade-off
between PD ad PFA, which we defer for future research.
V. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
We have chosen a simple 3-node wireless network with
chain topology to highlight that GSK generation schemes
are vulnerable to insider-threats, especially on topologies that
cannot support additional secure links to verify the attacks.
Without delving into the expensive option of establishing
secure links, it is an interesting direction for future research to
explore other low communication-overhead methods that can
detect attacks at high success rate by keeping the false positive
rates to low values.
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